Patent Litigation Insurance and R and D Incentives

Name: Patent Litigation Insurance and R and D Incentives
Cite: 28 Intl Rev. of Law & Econ. 272
Year: 2008
Bluebook cite: Luigi Buzzacchi & Giuseppe Scellato, Patent Litigation Insurance And R&D Incentives, 28 Int'l Rev. of Law & Econ. 272 (Dec. 2008)
Author: Luigi Buzzacchi & Giuseppe Scellato
URL: http://search.ebscohost.com.www.libproxy.wvu.edu/login.aspx?direct=true&db=buh&AN=35203759&site=ehost-live
Item Type: article
Summary: An empirical study of the effects of patent litigation insurance. In light of the potential for insurance to increase patent value by deterring imitators, the study examines why such insurance is limited in availability. Three models of insurance are studied (2 voluntary, one compulsory).The study ultimately concludes that compulsory insurance would not increase appropriablity of inventions. Rather, improved screening at the Patent Office and appropriate punitive damages for infringers would be the most efficient way to encourage that goal.

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