Commercializing Patents. Stanford Law Review, Forthcoming

Name: Commercializing Patents. Stanford Law Review, Forthcoming
Cite: UC Berkeley Public Law Research Paper No. 1395558
Year: 2008
Bluebook cite: Ted Sichelman, Commercializing Patents, 62 Stan. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2009); UC Berkeley Public Law Research Paper No. 1395558 (2008)
Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1395558
Author: Sichelman, Ted M.
URL: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1395558
Item Type: article
Summary: The author contends (by citing to empirical data)that the current patent system ("reward theory")retards commercialization of patents by rewarding the front end of the process (patenting a new invention) and neglecting the back end (commercializing the invention). The author also examines the cons of the "prospect theory" which proposes granting "strong patents with broad claims and real property-like rights" early in the invention process. The author concludes by offering a solution to encourage commercialization of inventions that splits traditional patents "into an invention patent, granted in exchange for the disclosure of new and non-obvious knowledge, and a commercialization patent, granted in exchange for the manufacture and sale of a substantially new product."

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