Trade Secrets and Information Sharing

Name: Trade Secrets and Information Sharing
Cite: 10 J. Ec. & Mgt. Strategy 391
Year: 2001
Bluebook cite: Thomas RÃ¸nde, Trade Secrets and Information Sharing, 10 J. Ec. & Mgt. Strategy 391 (2001).
Author: Thomas RÃ¸nde
URL: http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/viewarticle?data=dGJyMPPp44rp2%2fdV0%2bnjisfk5Ie47fSB8OvsgfSk63nn5Kx95uXxjL6nrkevqa1Krqa2OLGwsVG4q7I4zsOkjPDX7Ivf2fKB7eTnfLujr0%2b1prFPsayuTqTi34bls%2bOGpNrgVeDr5j7y1%2bVVv8Skeeyzs0uzrLNQtJzkh%2fDj34y75uJ%2bxOvqhNLb9owA&hid=14
Item Type: article
Summary: ABSTRACT: If trade secrets are weakly protected by law, firms risk losing their valuable information when employees are hired by competitors. It may therefore be optimal to limit the number of employees who share the trade secrets even if it reduces the firm's productive efficiency. The benefits of limited information sharing are greatest if the efficiency cost is low and the competition in the market is neither very tough nor very weak. It is shown that it is more profitable to reduce the information sharing by giving the employees different information than by giving some employees more information than others. Copyright (c) 2001 Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

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