Nuisance-Value Patent Suits: An Economic Model and Proposal

Name
Nuisance-Value Patent Suits: An Economic Model and Proposal
Cite
25 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 159
Year
2008
Bluebook cite
Ranganath Sudarshan, Nuisance-Value Patent Suits: An Economic Model and Proposal, 25 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 159 (2008).
Author
Ranganath Sudarshan
URL
25 SCCHITLJ 159
Item Type
article
Summary
Article presents an economic model that explains the dynamics of nuisance-value patent litigation, as well as the background conditions in patent law which facilitate these dynamics. The Article proposes a narrowly-tailored procedural mechanism which will allow district courts to liberally grant a stay of the infringement phase of a patent suit pending completion of an expedited validity phase. According to the article, “such a mechanism will provide economic incentives for defendants to litigate against nuisance patents rather than opt for nuisance settlements.”

Excerpts and Summaries

Created
Saturday 24 of January, 2009 23:32:14 GMT
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LastModif
Monday 02 of February, 2009 19:25:51 GMT
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