Do Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking Lead to Systematically Excessive Royalties?

Name

Do Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking Lead to Systematically Excessive Royalties?

Cite

4 J. Competition L. & Econ. 535

Year

2008

Bluebook cite

Einer Elhauge, Do Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking Lead to Systematically Excessive Royalties?, 4 J. Competition L. & Econ. 535 (2008).

Author

Einer Elhauge

URL

4 JCOMLE 535

Item Type

article

Summary

“Some recent literature has concluded that patent remedies result in systematically excessive royalties because of holdup and stacking problems. This article shows that this literature is mistaken. The royalty rates predicted by the holdup models are often (plausibly most of the time) below the true optimal rate. Further, those predicted royalty rates are overstated because of incorrect assumptions about constant demand, one-shot bargaining, and informational symmetry. . . . Royalty stacking does not lead to royalties that exceed the optimal rate, contrary to this literature, but in fact tends to produce royalties that are at or below the optimal rate.”

Excerpts and Summaries

Created

Saturday 24 of January, 2009 23:40:55 GMT
by Unknown

LastModif

Monday 02 of February, 2009 19:25:38 GMT
by Unknown