This Article proceeds as follows. In Part I, I describe existing evidence regarding the use of private protection mechanisms in industries producing goods that are generally eligible for patent protection. In Part II, I explore the implications of this body of evidence for the standard incentives theory of patent protection. In Part *1257 III, I propose the market-entry thesis as an alternative theory of patent protection. I also address the principal objection to this thesis posed by the prevalence of patenting among large, incumbent firms. In Part IV, I derive some preliminary policy implications from the market-entry thesis and also consider a possible extension of this Article's thesis to co-pyrightable goods and its more general implications for the analysis of intellectual property law.
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Wednesday 12 of August, 2009 17:14:31 GMT by Unknown
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Wednesday 12 of August, 2009 17:14:31 GMT by Unknown